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This paper examines the extent to which the destination of exports matters for the input prices
paid by firms, using detailed customs and firm-product-level data from Portugal. We use exchange-
rate movements as a source of variation in export destinations and find that exporting to richer
countries leads firms to charge more for outputs and pay higher prices for inputs, other things
equal. The results are supportive of the hypothesis that an exogenous increase in average des-
tination income leads firms to raise the average quality of goods they produce and to purchase
higher-quality inputs.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of literature suggests that exporting has significant effects on firm behavior.
Although results for productivity are mixed (Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and
Jensen, 1999; Alvarez and López, 2005; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; De Loecker, 2007), recent studies
have found causal effects of exporting on a variety of directly observable outcomes. For instance,
Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) find effects on technology investments by Argentinian
and Canadian firms, respectively, and Verhoogen (2008) finds effects on wages and ISO 9000
certification (an international production standard) in Mexico.
A number of potential theoretical explanations for such effects have been advanced. Perhaps
the most common class of models emphasizes scale effects: in the presence of fixed investment
costs, for instance for purchases of technology for production or worker screening, increases in
sales volume due to exports reduce the fixed costs per unit and tend to induce firms to undertake
such investments (Yeaple, 2005; Bustos, 2011; Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010). A key
feature of this class of models is that the effects of exporting on firm behavior depend on the
volume of exports per se, and not on the characteristics of particular export destinations. A
separate class of explanations focuses on quality choice: the varieties that firms sell on export
markets may differ from those that they sell on domestic markets, and the different varieties may
require different technologies, skills and other inputs in production. This class encompasses two
distinct mechanisms. One is that per-unit transport costs may lead firms to export goods with
higher value per unit, a phenomenon often referred to as the “Washington apples” effect following
the famous example in Alchian and Allen (1964).1 The other is that, if richer consumers are
more willing to pay for product quality, firms may choose to sell higher-quality varieties in richer
markets to appeal to them.2 These mechanisms both suggest that destinations matter, but they
emphasize different characteristics. In the first, what matters is distance from the home market
(or trade costs more broadly). In the second, what matters is the income level of consumers in
the destination.3
1See also Feenstra (1988), Hummels and Skiba (2004), and Feenstra and Romalis (forthcoming).
2The idea that richer consumers are more willing to pay for product quality has been in the trade literature at
least since Linder (1961). See also Markusen (1986), Flam and Helpman (1987), and Hallak (2006). We believe
that Verhoogen (2008) was the first to formalize the idea that an individual firm would choose to sell higher-quality
varieties in richer destination markets than in poorer ones in a heterogeneous-firm model.
3The list above is not exhaustive. Matsuyama (2007) formalizes the idea that exporting requires expenditures
on marketing and distribution that are not required on domestic markets. As stated by Matsuyama, this model
suggests that the volume of exports not destination characteristics should matter for firms’ decisions. A number
of authors have suggested that learning-by-exporting effects are important, although it is common not to specify
the extent to which such effects depend on characteristics of destination markets. An argument that learning-by-
1
Empirically, the relative importance of these different mechanisms remains an open question.
Plant-level datasets typically do not provide information on the destination of exports, which
makes it difficult to distinguish among the various channels. Newly available customs datasets
on firms’ international transactions have provided some support for the income-based quality-
choice mechanism. In Portuguese data, Bastos and Silva (2008, 2010) show that individual firms
charge higher “free on board” (f.o.b.) prices for goods sold to richer destination markets within
narrow product categories, controlling for distance and other destination characteristics.4 The
within-firm-product correlation between export prices and destination-country income appears
to be quite robust across countries: subsequent papers have documented a similar pattern in
data from China, France and Hungary (Manova and Zhang, 2012; Martin, 2012; Görg, Halpern,
and Muraközy, 2010). This cross-sectional evidence is not definitive, however, for two reasons.
First, firms may “price to market”: they may charge higher mark-ups in richer countries, even
for homogeneous goods (Krugman, 1987; Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Goldberg and Hellerstein,
2008; Alessandria and Kaboski, 2011; Fitzgerald and Haller, forthcoming; Simonovska, 2013).
Second, the cross-sectional evidence does not settle the issue of causality: even if export prices do
reflect product quality, shocks at the firm level may affect both which products a firm chooses to
sell and where it is able to sell them, leading to a positive correlation between price and destination
income even in the absence of a causal effect of exporting on firm behavior.
In this short paper, we use a rich combination of customs and firm-product-level price data
from Portugal to further investigate the income-based quality-choice channel. Our empirical ap-
proach is motivated by two theoretical ideas. First, as mentioned above, countries are asymmetric
in income and in their willingness to pay for product quality and individual firms choose to sell
higher-quality varieties in richer markets. Second, firm productivity and input quality are comple-
ments in producing output quality and firms use higher-quality inputs to produce higher-quality
products, as in Verhoogen (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). We develop a Melitz (2003)-
type model that embeds both ideas (which appears in the appendix to save space); although the
basic ingredients are familiar from the literature, we are not aware of a paper that combines them
in a general-equilibrium setting. The key theoretical implication is that an exogenous shift in the
exporting effects are particularly strong when exporting to richer foreign markets, for instance because of stricter
standards or more demanding buyers, is very much in the spirit of the income-based quality-choice story described
above (see e.g. De Loecker (2007)).
4The f.o.b. prices in principle should not include transport costs, which are likely to vary across countries. Bastos
and Silva (2008, 2010) also find a positive correlation between price and distance, consistent with the “Washington
apples” hypothesis.
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destination of exports toward a richer market will lead a firm not only to charge a higher output
price on average, but also to pay higher input prices on average. Empirically, using detailed in-
formation on output and input prices at the firm level and real-exchange-rate changes as a source
of exogenous variation in the composition of destination markets, we show that increases in the
average income level of export destinations lead Portuguese firms to charge more for outputs and
pay higher prices for material inputs, controlling for export share, average destination distance,
and total sales. We argue that although differences in mark-ups across countries may explain
the output price patterns, it is difficult to reconcile the effects on input prices with models that
do not allow a role for quality choice. We interpret the results as supportive of the hypothesis
that increased exporting to rich countries leads firms to raise the average quality of goods they
produce and to purchase higher-quality inputs.
This paper is most closely related to a recent study by Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2012).
Using trade-transactions data linked to a firm-level panel survey from Argentina, the authors ana-
lyze the effect of the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, which led Argentinian firms to reduce exports
to Brazil and increase the share of exports to other destinations — principally the U.S. and Eu-
rope. They find that increased exports to richer countries led to higher skill composition and
higher wages at the firm level, while increased exports per se had no such effect. The authors
interpret the results as supportive of the argument that firms sell higher-quality, skill-intensive
varieties in richer countries to appeal to richer consumers there. Relative to the Brambilla et
al. paper, the current study makes three main contributions. First, we have access to output
price data, including prices of products sold domestically, and we can show how average output
prices at the firm level respond to exogenous shifts in destinations. Second, we have access to
input price data, and we can show that average material input prices respond similarly. This is
a particular advantage because labor may be a special input: there are a number of mechanisms
that might lead to rent-sharing within a firm — e.g. collective bargaining, fair/efficiency wages
— and these might generate a relationship between wages and mark-ups (and hence destination
markets), even in the absence of quality effects. This concern is arguably less salient for mate-
rial input prices, since arm’s-length supplier-purchaser relationships are less subject to the social
pressures and institutional idiosyncrasies that characterize employment relationships in Argentina
and elsewhere.5 Third, we are able to distinguish between the “Washington apples” and income-
5Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) consider at some length the possibility that material input suppliers bargain for
higher input prices when output prices are higher, but find little evidence for such a mechanism in cross-sectional
data in Colombia.
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based quality-choice channels. In the Argentinian case, richer destinations (primarily the U.S.
and Europe) also tend to be further away than poorer destinations (primarily Brazil and other
countries in South America). In the Portuguese case, the correlation is reversed: richer destina-
tions (e.g. U.K, Sweden) tend be closer, and poorer destinations (e.g. Brazil, Angola) further
away. This provides a stronger basis for separate identification of the effects of income and dis-
tance. These contributions strengthen the income-based quality-choice interpretation, consistent
with the broader argument in Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2012) (as well as in Verhoogen
(2008)). In addition to the papers cited above, our paper is also related to a growing recent
literature on the role of product quality in trade, including Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow
(2005), Sutton (2007), Choi, Hummels, and Xiang (2009), Hallak and Schott (2011), Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011), Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and
Neary (2011), Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2012), Johnson (2012), Hallak and Sivadasan (2013),
Amiti and Khandelwal (2013), Markusen (2013), Caron, Fally, and Markusen (forthcoming), Di
Comite, Thisse, and Vandenbussche (forthcoming), Iacovone and Javorcik (2012), Harrigan, Ma,
and Shlychkov (2012), Kneller and Yu (2008), and Gervais (2013).
Although we focus on Portugal, a middle-income country, we believe that our findings have
implications for our understanding of the upgrading process in developing countries as well. In
particular, the results reinforce the idea that raising the quality of outputs requires raising the
quality of inputs (Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). This in turn suggests that
increasing exports to high income destinations may require the upgrading of entire complexes
of suppliers and downstream producers, not just of exporters. The particular empirical setting
has the advantage that it allows us to identify cleanly a causal relationship between destination
income and material input prices, but the basic findings seem likely to apply more broadly.
2 Data
The analysis in this paper draws on two main datasets, both collected by the Instituto Nacional
de Estat́ıstica (INE), the Portuguese national statistical agency:
1. Customs data on firm-level international trade transactions, which are collected separately
for European Union (EU) partner countries (Estat́ısticas Correntes do Comércio Intracomu-
nitário [Current Statistics on Intra-community Trade]) and non-EU partners (Estat́ısticas
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Correntes do Comércio Extracomunitário [Current Statistics on Extra-community Trade]).6
2. Inquérito Anual à Produção Industrial (IAPI) [Annual Survey of Industrial Production], a
special survey that solicits information on values and physical quantities of outputs, material
inputs, and energy sources of firms. The product-level information is reported using a 12-
digit PRODCOM classification, with approximately 5,300 different products, 3,300 different
material inputs, and 17 different energy sources appearing in the data. The IAPI data are
available for the period 1997-2005, with 6,800-8,300 manufacturing firms covered during
1997-2001 and a reduced number (2,300-3,900 manufacturing firms) covered in 2002-2005.7
To provide summary statistics, we supplemented this survey with additional information
on manufacturing firms’ attributes from the Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas
(SCIE) [Enterprise Integrated Accounts System], which provides a census of firms in 2005.8
We supplement these data with information on country characteristics from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators and CPI and nominal exchange rate information from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics.
Our firm-level estimation sample consists of manufacturing firms in the IAPI survey with
information on input purchases and physical quantities and output sales and quantities at the
product level. If a firm appears in the IAPI survey but not in the export or import customs
data, we assume that it had zero exports or imports. Table 1 reports summary statistics on our
estimation sample and the full set of exporters and importers in the customs data in 1997. Firms
in our estimation sample tend to have larger export revenues per year, serve more destinations,
export in more different product categories, source inputs from more countries, and source more
different types of inputs than firms in the full customs data set. Table 2 displays further de-
6The extra-community trade statistics capture the universe of external trade transactions. The intra-community
statistics capture shipments from firms registered in the value-added tax system whose value of annual shipments
exceed a cut-off that has changed over time. In 2005, for instance, the cut-off was 85,000 Euros. See Bastos and
Silva (2010) for further details.
7From 1997-2001 the IAPI was intended to include manufacturing firms to cover 90% of total manufacturing
sales. Firms were ranked in descending order of sales and included until the 90% threshold was reached, with some
minor qualifications: all firms with 20 or more employees were included, all firms in sectors with fewer than 5 firms
were included, and once included in the sample firms were followed in subsequent years. In 2002-2005, for budgetary
reasons, the set of sectors covered by the survey was reduced. These sampling procedures make it difficult to make
cross-sectional comparisons by firm size (in contrast to Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) who had access to data with
wider and more consistent coverage). Our main focus in this paper is on within-firm changes over time, conditional
on a firm being sampled.
8To reduce the influence of outliers in the IAPI unit values data, we followed a suggestion of Angrist and Krueger
(1999) and “winsorized” the unit values within product category, pooling across years, mapping observations below
the 1st percentile of the distribution of real unit values to the 1st percentile and observations above the 99th
percentile to the 99th. The results reported below are robust to not winsorizing, or winsorizing by product-year.
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scriptive statistics on our estimation sample and the 2005 census of firms. We see that firms in
our estimation sample tend to be larger, older and pay higher average wages than the typical
manufacturing firm. They are also considerably more likely to be an exporter or importer. Our
empirical analysis is therefore best suited to shed light on the behavior of large manufacturing
firms, which typically account for the bulk of trade flows in each country (Bernard and Jensen,
1999; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Freund and Pierola, 2012).9
Appendix Table A1 presents descriptive statistics on export destinations and source markets
for input purchases of Portuguese firms in 1997, both in the full customs data and in our estima-
tion sample, excluding petroleum trade. The leading destinations and source countries include
several richer nations that adopted the Euro during our study period (Germany, Spain, France,
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy) but also include non-Euro-zone countries such as the UK, US,
Sweden, and Switzerland.10 Among the main destination and source countries are several lower
income nations such as Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Turkey, Morocco and Russia. We see that, for
the vast majority of export destinations and source countries, bilateral export and import shares
in the estimation sample are relatively similar to those in the full customs data. Appendix Table
A2 provides summary statistics on firms in the estimation sample for each year of the period
under analysis. We see that, for most indicators of interest, averages across firms remain fairly
stable over time, despite the reduction in sample size observed after 2001.
3 Empirical Methodology
We are interested in examining the effect of the income level of export destinations on output and
input prices. Although the Portuguese data are among the most detailed available in the world,
we do not observe input prices at the production-line level (corresponding to firm-destination-
products or firm-destinations). Our strategy instead is to relate average output and input prices
at the firm level to average destination income at the firm level. We describe the steps we follow
to calculate average output and input prices at the firm level at the end of this section. We are
9By the same token, the data are not particularly well suited to cross-sectional comparisons between small and
large firms, which require information on something closer to a full census of firms.
10The currencies of the initial set of countries in the Euro-zone were fixed in relation to one another on Jan.
1, 1999, and the Euro bills and coins were introduced on Jan. 1, 2002. The original members of the Euro-zone
are France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Finland, and Austria. Greece and
Denmark joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in 1999, and Greece adopted the Euro in 2001.
The Danish Krone remained pegged to the Euro thereafter. We treat Greece and Denmark as part of the Euro-zone
for our purposes. We also include several smaller countries (or administrative regions) that use the Euro as their
currency: Andorra, Malta, San Marino, Slovenia, Réunion, Mayotte, Guadalupe, Guyana.
6
ultimately interested in estimating a model of the following form:
pit = log(inc)itβ +Xitα+ ai + bt + εit (1)
where i and t index firms and years, respectively; pit is a firm-level average output or input price;
incit is the average GDP per capita of firm i’s export destinations in year t; Xit are other time-
varying firm characteristics, including export share of sales, log average destination distance, and
log total sales; ai is a firm fixed effect; bt is a year effect; and εit is a conditional-mean-zero error
term.
A general concern with estimating (1) by OLS is that there may be unobserved differences
among firms that affect both the composition of export destinations and prices at the firm level.
One relevant possibility is that there are input-cost shocks at the firm level. We would expect firms
to pass increases in input costs at least partly into increases in output prices.11 The direction of
bias in the OLS estimates of β for output and input prices will then depend on how the composition
of destination countries responds to the increase in output prices. In the single-sector model that
appears in the appendix, the price elasticity of demand is constant across countries (refer to
equation (A2) in the appendix). But in plausible alternative models, for instance the multi-
sector model with additively separable utility recently explored by Caron, Fally, and Markusen
(forthcoming), price elasticities are higher for more income-elastic goods, and richer countries
tend to consume more income-elastic goods, with the consequence that a given increase in output
prices may lead to a greater decline in sales in richer countries (and hence a negative correlation
between log(inc)it and the error term). On the other hand, if for a given product rich-country
consumers are less price-sensitive than poor-country consumers, then the response to a given
output-price increase may be smaller in richer countries. There may also be responses on the
extensive margin of products; these will depend on the fixed costs of selling to different markets,
and it is not clear theoretically where the extensive-margin response to an output-price increase
will be greater. If sales are more responsive rich countries, then we would expect negative biases
in the OLS estimates of β in (1) for both the output-price and input-price regressions; if sales
are less responsive in rich countries, we would expect positive biases. Additionally, measurement
11Such pass-through of input cost shocks is a reason to be cautious in interpreting cross-sectional correlations
between input prices and output prices at the firm level as evidence that high-quality inputs are used to produce
high-quality outputs, as in Manova and Zhang (2012). As Khandelwal (2010), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and
others have argued, one needs additional information on sales (and ideally measures of market power in input
markets) to justify inferences about product quality in cross-sectional data.
7
error in average destination income would be expected to lead to attenuation in OLS estimates
for both output and input prices. Other forms of bias are also possible.12 In short, it is not clear
theoretically whether we would expect the OLS estimates to be understated or overstated.
To deal with the omitted-variables concerns, we use real-exchange-rate movements to construct
instruments for average destination income. A key challenge in constructing the instruments is
to identify a source of variation at the firm level. Our strategy relies on the observation that
a real-exchange-rate movement in a particular destination market does not matter equally for
all Portuguese firms; it matters particularly for Portuguese firms that have already developed
relationships with buyers in that destination. Motivated by this observation, we construct instru-
ments by interacting (a simple transformation of) the real exchange rate in a destination with
an indicator for whether a firm had positive exports to the destination in the initial year of our
sample.13
As a first step in explaining the IV strategy, consider the following empirical model for sales
in each destination:
sijt = µij + rpljtγj + (rpljt ∗ Cij,1997) δj + uijt (2)
where i, j, and t index firms, destinations and years; sijt denotes the share of firm i’s total sales
in year t that are due to exports to destination j;14 µij is a firm-destination fixed effect; Cij,1997 is
an indicator for whether firm i had any exports to destination j in the initial year of our sample,
1997; and rpljt is the “relative price level” of destination j in year t, defined as the log of the
12Related to the input-cost-shock argument above, if firms pass on increases in input costs more in rich countries
than in poor countries, then (with similar sensitivities of sales to price across countries) we would expect a positive
bias in OLS. Another relevant possibility is that there are productivity shocks at the firm level. In the model
developed in the appendix, as in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), productivity matters in two ways: it reduces input
requirements per unit of output and it raises output quality for a given set of inputs. If the former effect is stronger
than the latter, then output price will decrease with a positive productivity shock. At the same time, higher
productivity will lead firms to purchase higher-quality inputs, produce higher-quality outputs, and expand sales
relatively more in richer countries. In this case, there will be a negative bias for output prices in OLS, and a positive
bias for input prices. In the model in the appendix, this case occurs when b < 2a. See equation (A5d). In the
case where b > 2a, and hence where productivity increases lead to output price increases and quality increases,
firm-level productivity shocks would be expected to lead to a positive bias to OLS in both the output price and
input price regressions.
13Similar instruments based on real exchange rates have been used at the sector level by Revenga (1992) and
Bertrand (2004), and at the firm level by Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010), Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto
(2012), and Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (forthcoming) among others.
14We use the share of the firm’s total sales rather than log(sales) so that we do not lose destinations with zero
exports.
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where ejt is the nominal exchange rate. Here h indicates Home (Portugal). Using the reciprocal of
the real exchange rate rather than the real exchange rate itself is purely a matter of convenience:
it facilitates the exposition that δj is expected to be positive.
As a measure of the income level of each destination market, we use GDP per capita in
the year prior to the beginning of our sample, 1996, to avoid possible endogeneity issues with




sijt · gdppcj,1996 (4)
One strategy for constructing an instrument for incit would be to estimate (2), recover the pre-
dicted values ŝijt, and plug them into the expression (4). But estimating (2) by OLS would
generate negative values, especially given the large number of firm-destination pairs with zero
exports. Estimating a non-linear model such as a tobit would be challenging because of the pres-
ence of the large number of incidental parameters, µij . Instead we take a more “reduced form”
approach that avoids the need to estimate (2) in a preliminary step. Combining (2) and (4), we
can write:
incit = ψi + λt +
∑
j∈J
(rpljt · Cij,1997)φj + vit (5)
where ψi =
∑
j∈J µij gdppcj,1996, λt =
∑
j∈J rpljt gdppcj,1996, φj = δj gdppcj,1996, and vit =∑
j∈J uijt gdppcj,1996.
Equation (5) suggests that the full set of relative-price-level interaction terms, rpljt · Cij,1997
for available destinations j, could serve as instruments for incit in an IV estimation of (1). But
it is important to note that the movements of relative price levels may have a direct effect on
input prices, and hence on output prices.16 If such movements matter for input prices especially
15In a small number of destinations, GDP per capita is not observed in 1996. In these cases, we use GDP per
capita in the first subsequent year in which it is observed.
16A large literature on exchange-rate pass-through investigates the relationship between exchange-rate-driven
movements in input prices and output prices at the firm level. Although pass-through is typically found to be less
than complete, it is also typically found to be greater than zero. See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and more recent
work by Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008, 2013) and Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings
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for firms that have initial importing relationships with the relevant source country, and initial
importing relationships are correlated with initial exporting relationships, then the IV exclusion
restriction for a model of the form of (1) will be violated. This concern has not always been taken
into account in the literature using exchange rates as instruments for exports. To absorb these
direct effects, we construct interactions of the relative price levels with indicators for whether
a firm has positive imports from a particular source country, rpljt · Dij,1997, where Dij,1997 = 1
if firm i has positive imports from country j in 1997, and equals zero otherwise. We include
these relative price level/initial importer interactions directly as covariates in the main outcome
equation. Thus our main estimating equation is:
pit = log(inc)itβ +Xitα+ ai + bt +
∑
j∈J
(rpljt ·Dij,1997)χj + εit (6)
where incit is instrumented by the terms rpljt ∗Cij,1997. In the cases of firms that initially import
from and export to the same set of countries, the effect of the relative-price-level movements
will be captured by the relative price level/importer interactions. The coefficient on average
destination income will be identified by differences between the initial sets of import sources and
export destinations, and the differential response to relative price level movements that result
from them.
In constructing the average destination income (and average destination distance), we calcu-
late a weighted average over all destinations, including the domestic market, using sales to the
destination as weights.17 However, in our baseline specification we drop some destinations from
the instrument set. Portugal is a member of the Euro-zone, and since 1999 has shared the Euro
with a number of its main trading partners. For these partners, the only changes in the relative
price level over the 1999-2005 period were due to differential rates of inflation. One might worry
that omitted variables such as firm-level productivity shocks in Portuguese firms might contribute
to inflation rates in the Euro-zone. For this reason, in our baseline specification we omit the Euro-
zone states from our set of instruments (as well as from the set of relative price level/importer
interactions). The qualitative results are not affected when we include the Euro-zone countries
in the instrument set. We also limit the number of countries in the instrument set to 100, by
descending order of export share. The qualitative results are robust to including 50, 75 or 125
(forthcoming).
17Domestic sales are not observed in the customs data, but we observe domestic sales, as well as domestic
purchases, in the IAPI data.
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destinations instead.
As noted above, in the set of covariates represented by Xit we include the export share of sales
at the firm level, log average destination distance (assigning a value of 1km to domestic sales), and
log total sales. One might worry that export share and average distance are also endogenous, for
reasons similar to those discussed in connection to average destination income. Conveniently, the
same set of relative price level interactions are also plausible instruments for these two covariates.
That is, because the relative price movements interacted with the initial export indicator affect
sales to each destination, they also affect the export share of sales and average destination distance.
Below we present IV specifications in which we treat these covariates as endogenous.
It remains to explain how we construct the firm-level average output and input prices, repre-
sented by pit in (1) and (6). We first run the following regression:
log uvikt = θit + ξkt + uikt (7)
where i indexes firms, k indexes products, t indexes years; uvit is the unit value for product k in
firm i in year t, calculated as total output sales (or input purchases) divided by units of physical
quantity; θit is a firm-year fixed effect and ξkt is a product-year fixed effect. We use information
only on manufactured outputs or inputs. Note that the product-year effects capture all common
factors that affect the price of a particular output or input across firms; the firm-year effects, θit,
are thus identified by comparisons with other firms producing the same product or purchasing
the same input in the same year. The OLS estimates θ̂it reflect average prices at the firm level
purged of effects due to the composition of products. We define the average output and input
prices to be equal to these OLS estimates (setting pit = θ̂it), estimated separately for output unit
values and input unit values.18
18An alternative approach would be to regress the output or input unit values (log(uvikt) in (7)) directly on
the covariates in (6), using the same instruments as described above. Using a particular choice of weights, such a
“one-step” approach would be numerically equivalent to the “two-step” approach that we employ (first estimating
the θ̂it from (7) and then estimating (6)) (Amemiya, 1978; Donald and Lang, 2007). Using different weights, Kugler
and Verhoogen (2012) report both one-step and two-step estimates and show that they are similar. Here we focus




Before turning to our IV estimates, we present a descriptive analysis of two key empirical relation-
ships underlying our approach. We first confirm the cross-sectional finding from Bastos and Silva
(2010) that firms charge higher prices to richer destinations in the same narrow product category
in the same year. Table 3 presents regressions of log export unit values at the firm-product level
on indicators of destination income per capita and a number of other destination characteristics
(standard in gravity regressions), for firms in our estimation sample in the initial year (1997).
The “richer than Portugal” variable is an indicator for whether the country’s GDP per capita is
above Portugal’s, and log GDP/cap refers to income in the destination country. Consistent with
Bastos and Silva (2010), the results indicate that individual firms charge higher prices in richer
countries, on average, even controlling for firm-product fixed effects.19
We now consider the effects of real exchange rate movements on sales of Portuguese firms. To
provide a visual sense of the variation underlying the fluctuations in the firm-specific exchange
rates, Appendix Figures A1 and A2 illustrate the movements in the relative price levels (reciprocals
of real exchange rates) of Portugal’s principal non-euro-zone trading partners, for countries richer
and poorer than Portugal, respectively. Prima facie, the swings in relative price levels appear large
enough to have been economically significant, especially in poorer countries such as Brazil, Angola,
Turkey, and Russia, Portugal’s 13th, 17th, 21st and 27th most important export destinations.
Table 4 analyzes the response of Portuguese firms’ sales to the relative price level movements.
Panel A of Table 4 uses data at the firm-destination-product-year level. We see that increases in
the relative price level in a destination are associated with an increase in the share of a firm’s total
sales derived from each product sold in that destination, even when including firm-destination-
product effects (Column 2). Column 3 includes an interaction of the relative price level with an
indicator for whether the firm had positive initial exports to the destination. We see that the
response to relative price movements is much larger for firms with initial positive exports to the
destination. The message is similar whether we interact the relative price movements with an
indicator for any exports to the destination in the initial year (Column 3) or with the firm’s initial
share of sales in the destination (Column 4). Using data aggregated to the firm-destination level
19Table A3 shows that an analogous pattern holds for imports: within narrow product categories, imports from
richer nations tend carry higher prices, in line with prior findings in the literature (Schott, 2004; Hummels and
Klenow, 2005; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Hallak and Schott, 2011).
12
(and hence corresponding to equation (2), again constraining the δ coefficient across destinations),
Panel B of Table 4 conveys the same basic message. It appears, in other words, that although
relative price movements in destination countries potentially affect all firms, they especially affect
firms with initial attachment to the destination.
4.2 Main Results
We now turn to the estimation of the relationships between average output and input prices
and destination income. Columns 1-4 of Table 5 present simple OLS estimates of equation (6)
for average output prices, successively adding more covariates. In OLS, there appears to be
no statistically significant relationship between destination income and output prices. As noted
above, however, there are plausible reasons why the OLS coefficient on average destination income
could be biased in either a positive or a negative direction. Columns 5-8 present IV estimates
of the same equation, using the interactions of relative price level movements and indicators for
initial positive sales in a destination as excluded instruments. Column 5 treats only log avg.
destination income as endogenous; Column 6 adds the share of sales from exports and Column
7 log avg. destination distance to the set of endogenous covariates. The first stage of the IV
estimation is reported in Appendix Table A4.20 Table 6 is organized in the same way as Table 5,
but with average input prices as the outcome variable.
Before discussing the IV estimates, it is important to consider two possible concerns about
the IV strategy. First, although including the (initial exporter * relative price level) interaction
terms directly avoids the difficulties of estimating a non-linear relationship between sales share
and relative price levels discussed above, it also makes the first-stage coefficients more difficult
to interpret. Based on the fact that increases in firm-level sales shares are on average positively
associated with the interaction of the initial export indicator and relative price level for a destina-
tion (Table 4), we would expect to see a positive effect of the instrument on average destination
income for richer destinations and a negative effect for poorer destinations. The estimates largely
conform to this pattern but there are many exceptions. These exceptions appear to be driven
by the fact that in several destinations initial non-exporters reacted more to the relative price
movements than initial exporters, for idiosyncratic reasons.
Second, there is reason to be concerned that the instruments are weakly correlated with average
20Column 5 of Table 5 corresponds to Column 1 in Table A4; Column 6 to Columns 2 and 4; and Column 7 to
Columns 3, 5, and 6.
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destination income and the other potentially endogenous covariates. Tables 5 and 6 report a
number of diagnostic statistics for the first stage, which is common between them. Because we have
no particular reason to believe that errors are homoskedastic, we use the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test statistics for under-identification and weak instruments. The
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the endogenous
regressors are unidentified. This leaves open the possibility that the instruments are only weakly
correlated with the endogenous regressors, however. Stock and Yogo (2005) tabulate critical
values for the Cragg-Donald (1993) F-statistic to use in testing the null that instruments are
weak in the homoskedastic case. Because we are reluctant to assume homoskedasticity, we instead
report the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald rk F-statistic. Although the
appropriate critical values in the heteroskedastic case have not been tabulated in the literature
(Mikusheva, 2013), common practice is to compare this statistic to the Stock-Yogo critical values.
This comparison suggests that we cannot reject the null of weak instruments. For this reason,
below we report weak-instrument-robust test statistics and consider further the consequences of
weakness of the instruments.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we now turn back to the IV estimates in Table 5. The IV esti-
mates of the coefficient on the destination-income term are significantly positive and significantly
greater than the OLS estimates. Given the positive cross-sectional correlation of export prices
and destination income in cross section (Table 3), this result is perhaps not surprising, but it is
nonetheless reassuring for our strategy. Because of the weak-instruments concern, we also report
a Anderson-Rubin (1949) Wald test, which is robust to weak instruments. This is a test of the
null that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are jointly zero when they are included in
place of the endogenous covariates in the outcome equation. In the specification of Column 5,
this is equivalent to a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on the destination-income term is
zero. The test decisively rejects the null. In Columns 6 and 7, where there are multiple endoge-
nous covariates, the Anderson-Rubin test corresponds to the hypothesis that the coefficients on
the endogenous covariates are jointly zero. Tests for subsets of endogenous regressors in weakly
identified IV models is a frontier of research in econometric theory (Mikusheva, 2013), and the
literature has not converged on a standard test in this setting. Here we satisfy ourselves with
two simple observations. First, it is reassuring that the IV estimates of the destination-income
coefficient are reasonably robust across specifications. Second, in settings with weak instruments,
IV estimates are “biased towards” the corresponding OLS estimates (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke
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(2009, ch. 4) for discussion). Given that the corresponding OLS estimate in Column 4 is signif-
icantly smaller than than the IV estimates in Columns 5-7, this suggests that the IV estimates
are likely to be underestimates of the true relationships.
We now turn to the results for input prices in Table 6. The OLS estimates for the relationship
between destination income and input prices are positive and significant, although these should be
interpreted with caution because of the omitted-variables concerns discussed above. The key point
of the table — indeed, of this paper — is that the IV estimates are positive and highly significant in
Columns 5-7. As above, weak instruments are a concern. In Column 5, the Anderson-Rubin F-test
indicates that we can reject the null that the coefficient on the destination-income term is zero with
a high level of confidence. Regarding Columns 6 and 7, we again note that the IV estimates for
the destination-income term are robust across specifications and that, if anything, since we expect
IV to be biased towards OLS in the weak-instruments case, the reported coefficients are likely to
be underestimates. As an additional check, we also follow a suggestion of Angrist and Pischke
(2009, Section 4.6.4) and report limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates of
the same model, since LIML estimates tend to be more robust to weakness of the instruments
than IV. These appear in Table A5 and correspond to Columns 5-7 of Table 6. Reassuringly,
the results are similar to those for IV, and are a bit larger, consistent with the idea that the IV
estimates are more biased towards OLS than the LIML estimates. In unreported results, we have
found that the basic patterns in Tables 5 and 6 survive a number of robustness checks: (1) using
50, 75 or 125 instruments instead of 100; (2) not winsorizing prices, or winsorizing by year; (3)
including non-manufacturing outputs or inputs in the calculation of firm-level average prices; and
(4) including Euro-zone destinations in the instrument set.
Considering Tables 5 and 6 together, a number of points are worth noting. First, and most
obviously, the positive significant IV coefficients for both output and input prices are consistent
with the hypothesis that exogenous shifts in exporting toward richer destinations are associated
with an increase in average output and input quality within firms. Second, the magnitudes appear
to be economically significant: our baseline estimates in Column 5 of each table suggest that a
10% increase in average destination income leads to a 20% increase in average output prices and
a 7% increase in average input prices. Third, the fact that the estimates are larger for output
prices than for input prices suggests that both mark-ups and product quality increase when firms
sell to richer destinations. That is, the results provide evidence for both the pricing-to-market
and the income-based quality-choice stories discussed in the introduction. Our key contention
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is that pricing-to-market alone cannot entirely explain the empirical patterns, in particular the
response of input prices; quality-choice also appears to be playing an important role. Fourth,
although there is some evidence that exogenous increases in average distance are associated with
higher average input prices (Column 7 of Table 6), the relationships between within-firm changes
in prices and within-firm changes in export share, average distance and total sales do not appear
to be robust. This is not to argue that there is no relationship between these variables and firm-
level prices; the standard errors are large enough that it is not possible to rule out economically
significant positive effects.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the effects of export shocks to different destinations on the input prices
paid by Portuguese manufacturing firms. We have used real-exchange-rate movements, interacted
with indicators for firms’ initial export presence in particular destinations, as instruments for the
average income of destination markets (and other endogenous covariates) at the firm level. There
is reason to be concerned that the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous
covariates, but weak-instrument-robust statistical tests indicate that there is a positive, statisti-
cally significant relationship between average destination income and both output and material
input prices within firms. The fact that the pattern holds for input prices as well as output prices
suggests that it is not simply due to pricing-to-market behavior by firms. The income-price re-
lationships hold when controlling for the export share of sales, average destination distance, and
total sales at the firm level, suggesting that scale effects and the “Washington apples” effect —
two leading alternative hypotheses to explain the effect of exporting on firm behavior — cannot
provide a full explanation for the empirical patterns. Our findings are supportive of what we
have called the income-based quality-choice channel: exporting to richer countries leads firms to
upgrade the quality of outputs, which requires purchasing higher-quality inputs. Although we
do not observe quality directly, the empirical patterns documented here add to the accumula-
tion of evidence in the literature that quality choice of both outputs and inputs is an important
component of firms’ behavior in the international economy.
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exports per firm 1.34 5.06
(0.13) (0.72)
share of exports to richer nations 0.61 0.79
(0.00) (0.01)
number of export destinations 3.78 7.71
(0.05) (0.15)
number of export categories 8.47 10.03
(0.19) (0.28)
imports per firm 1.29 3.44
(0.06) (0.37)
share of imports from richer nations 0.88 0.90
(0.00) (0.00)
number of import source countries 3.66 5.63
(0.02) (0.08)




fraction exporter and importer 0.35
N (firms) 12660 20280 6585
Notes: Table reports averages across firms, weighting firms equally. First four rows are conditional on being
an exporter (i.e. having positive exports), and second four rows are conditional on being an importer (i.e. having
positive imports). Values of exports and imports in millions of 2000 euros. Petroleum exports and imports excluded
in calculations. Standard errors of means in parentheses.












age of firm 15.74 25.08
(0.32) (0.86)
number of establishments in Portugal 1.17 1.83
(0.01) (0.11)
fraction exporter 0.15 0.62
fraction importer 0.14 0.61
N (firms) 45031 2522
Notes: Table reports averages across firms, weighting firms equally. Values of revenues (sales plus income from
provision of subcontracting and other services) are in millions of 2000 euros. Average annual earning per worker
are in thousands of 2000 euros. Standard errors of means in parentheses. Estimation sample contains 2639 firms in
2005; a small number of firms could not be linked to the manufacturing census.
Table 3. Destination characteristics and export prices in cross section, 1997
dep. var.: firm-product log export price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
richer than Portugal 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.03)
log GDP/cap. 0.03** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
log GDP 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
European Union 0.06** 0.03 0.07*** 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
landlocked -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
log distance 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
product effects Y N Y N
firm-product effects N Y N Y
R2 0.73 0.94 0.73 0.94
N 35438 35438 35438 35438
Notes: Sample is all firm-product-destination observations for firms in estimation sample. Petroleum exports
excluded. Robust standard errors, clustered by destination, in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.
Table 4. Sales Response to Relative Price Level Movements
dep. var.: % firm’s sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Data at firm-destination-product-year level
log(rel. price level) 0.092*** 0.100*** 0.022** 0.031***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
log(rel. price level)*1(any exports in 1997) 0.430***
(0.041)




firm-product-destination effects N Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y Y
R2 0.15 0.70 0.70 0.70
N 954025 954025 954025 954025
B. Data at firm-destination-year level
log(rel. price level) 0.563*** 0.579*** 0.236*** 0.298***
(0.076) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054)
log(rel. price level)*1(any exports in 1997) 1.134***
(0.134)




firm-destination effects N Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y Y
R2 0.32 0.80 0.80 0.80
N 191793 191793 191793 191793
Notes: Relative price level defined as in (3) in text. Variables 1(any exports in 1997) and sales share in 1997 defined
at firm-destination-product level in Panel A and firm-destination level in Panel B. Robust standard errors, clustered
at firm-year level, in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.
Table 5. Destination income and firm average output prices
dep. var.: firm-average log real output price
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log avg. destination gdp/cap 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 2.06*** 1.76*** 1.75***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.64) (0.66) (0.66)
export share of sales 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.95*** 0.63 0.63
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.34) (0.91) (0.91)
log avg. destination distance -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.06* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07)
log sales 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
initial source interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (under-identification) 248.92 192.30 232.20
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-stat (weak insts.) 2.65 2.09 2.32
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F-stat 2.98 2.99 2.99
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Instruments are interactions of indicators for positive exports to destination in 1997 and log relative price level (reciprocal of real-exchange rate)
for Portugal’s top 100 non-Euro-zone export destinations; see first-stage results in Table A4. Initial source interactions, included directly as covariates,
are defined analogously to the instruments, using indicators for initial imports. Columns 5 treats only log avg. destination GDP/cap as endogenous;
Column 6 adds export share of sales, and Column 7 adds log avg. destination distance to endogenous set. Petroleum exports and imports excluded.
Euro-zone countries not included in instrument set. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.
Table 6. Destination income and firm average input prices
dep. var.: firm-average log real input price
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log avg. destination gdp/cap 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.68***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
export share of sales -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.33** -0.22 -0.22
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.31) (0.32)
log avg. destination distance -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.06**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
log sales 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
initial source interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (under-identification) 248.92 192.30 232.20
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-stat (weak insts.) 2.65 2.09 2.32
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F-stat 2.17 2.18 2.18
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Instruments are interactions of indicators for positive exports to destination in 1997 and log relative price level (reciprocal of real-exchange rate)
for Portugal’s top 100 non-Euro-zone export destinations; see first-stage results in Table A4. Initial source interactions, included directly as covariates,
are defined analogously to the instruments, using indicators for initial imports. Columns 5 treats only log avg. destination GDP/cap as endogenous;
Column 6 adds export share of sales, and Column 7 adds log avg. destination distance to endogenous set. Petroleum exports and imports excluded.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.







This section develops a model of endogenous input and output quality choices by heterogeneous
firms in asymmetric countries in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for product
quality, building on the Melitz (2003) framework. It can be understood as a general-equilibrium
formulation of the model in Verhoogen (2008), which employed a logit-based demand system in
a partial-equilibrium setting. The model provides a framework for thinking about how exchange-
rate movements will affect average output and input prices at the firm level.1
A.1 Set-up
Consider three countries, Home (h), North (n) and South (s), where we think of North as richer
than Home and South as poorer than Home in a manner which will be discussed below. Let i
index the location of production and j index the location of consumer purchases. In each country,
there are three sectors: (1) a homogeneous-good “outside” sector producing for consumption; (2)
a differentiated manufacturing sector producing final goods for consumption; (3) a perfectly com-
petitive, non-traded intermediate-input sector, supplying the final-good manufacturers. Both the
final-good manufacturing sector and the intermediate-input sector may have quality differences,
as will be discussed below.
As in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Chaney (2008), and other papers, we assume that
the outside-good sector is perfectly competitive, produces under constant returns to scale, and is
costlessly traded, and that countries’ endowments of effective units of labor, Li, are sufficiently
similar that in equilibrium all countries produce the homogeneous good. We take the homogeneous
good to be the numeraire. We denote labor productivity in the sector by wi, i.e. one unit of
effective labor can produce wi units of the homogeneous good. As a consequence, the wage rate
in country i will be pinned down at wi. We will focus on an initial equilibrium in which countries’
productivities in the outside-good sector are the same: wh = wn = ws = 1. This assumption is
not quite as restrictive as it may initially appear, since we can be agnostic about how units of
effective labor are bundled into each person; individuals in North can be thought of as embodying
more units of effective labor (and hence earning higher wages) than individuals in Home or South,
even though the wage per unit of effective labor is initially equal across the countries. Below we
consider the comparative-static consequences of shocks to wi in particular countries.














Z is the quantity of the homogeneous good consumed; β > 0 will be the budget share spent on
differentiated goods; ω indexes varieties in the final-good sector; Ωj is the set of all differentiated
1 A number of recent papers have developed heterogeneous-firm models in which more-productive firms (under
some circumstances) produce higher quality goods: see e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Johnson (2012) , Hallak
and Sivadasan (2013), Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2012), Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2011), and Gervais
(2013). The Melitz (2003) model can also be interpreted in terms of quality-differentiated outputs; see Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012, appendix D) for further discussion. This model differs both in the heterogeneity in willingness
to pay for quality across countries and in the treatment of inputs. The model is also related to papers by Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) and Hsieh and Ossa (2011), which
extend the Melitz (2003) framework to allow for differences in wages across countries without explicitly considering
quality choices or differences in willingness to pay for quality across countries.
A1
varieties available in country j; σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, where we
make the standard assumption that σ > 1; and x(ω) is the quantity of variety ω consumed. Here
q(ω) represents the quality of variety ω, which we assume is chosen by firms, and µj represents
the valuation that consumers place on quality, which we take as exogenous.2 To guarantee an
interior solution to the optimization problem below, we assume that µj >
1
2 for all j. We assume
that willingness to pay for quality is greater in richer countries, such that µn > µh > µs.
3
If all units of effective labor are employed at wage wi, as will be true in equilibrium, then the





where p(ω) is the price of variety ω, Pj is a quality-adjusted ideal price index,
4 and wjLj is total
income in country j.
As in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), the intermediate sector transforms units of effective labor
into intermediate inputs of different qualities, under constant returns to scale. The production
function in this sector (the same in all countries) is FI(`, c) =
`
c , where c is the quality of the
input produced and ` is units of effective labor. The production cost of an intermediate input
of quality c in country i will be wic. In the simplest interpretation, which we adopt hereafter,
the final-good sector only uses material inputs. But the intermediate-input sector could also be
thought of as an education sector, which converts units of effective labor into workers of different
skill levels, who are subsequently employed in the final-good sector.
As in Melitz (2003), potential final-good entrepreneurs in each country must make an invest-
ment of fe effective labor units in their home country (at cost wife, given the wage rate), to enter
the final-good sector and receive a capability draw, λ.5 We assume that in all countries capability





, with 0 < λm ≤ λ. (We will
impose a positive lower bound on k, as explained below.) Each period a fraction δ of firms dies
for exogenous reasons; we focus on a steady-state in which an equal mass of new entrants replaces
the exiters. We assume that there is a fixed cost for a firm located in country i to produce for
market j of fij effective labor units (paid to labor in their home country, at cost wifij), that there
is an iceberg variable cost of trade of τij , and that these costs are symmetric across countries in
the sense that fij = fx and τij = τ > 1 for i 6= j, and fij = f and τij = 1 for i = j. We will also
assume that fx is sufficiently larger than f that only a subset of firms in the domestic market will
export.
2Here product quality, q(ω), may reflect consumer perceptions (for instance, due to advertising) rather than
inherent physical characteristics. The key point is that q(ω) is perceived to be the same by all consumers. Consumer
heterogeneity in the perception of quality is best thought of as being captured by µj . In this model, we assume that
µj varies only across countries, not within. This is clearly a drastic simplification, but given that in the empirical
analysis we observe only which country a good is sold in, not the characteristics of consumers it is sold to, the
assumption is suitable for our purposes in this paper.
3Ideally, one would be able to derive differences in willingness to pay for quality from income differences, as
in the logit specification of Verhoogen (2008). But here, in the interests of tractability, we follow the literature
in assuming exogenous differences in preferences for quality across countries in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) framework (Hallak, 2006; Hallak and Schott, 2011).












5Following Sutton (2007), we use the term “capability” to refer to the Melitz productivity draw in order to avoid
confusion below, where we allow the parameter to affect both production costs and quality.
A2
In each country, production of physical units in the final-good sector is given by F (n) = nλa,
where n is the number of units of inputs used and the constant a > 0 reflects the extent to which
capability lowers unit costs. Given this assumption, the marginal cost of each unit of output is
pIi(c)
λa . Following the first variant of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), the production of quality in the
















We assume θ < 0, which guarantees that firm capability, λ, and input quality, c, are complements
in generating output quality. The parameter b can be interpreted as capturing the technological
scope for improving quality with increased know-how, or what might be termed the scope for
quality differentiation. We assume that producing quality does not require fixed investments.
We assume that there is no cost of differentiation and that each firm produces a single, distinct
variety for each market that it enters. It is convenient to think of firms as producing on up to
three separate production lines, corresponding to the three possible destinations, Home, North
and South. To ensure that the distribution of revenues has finite variance in all countries, we








, where the right-hand side is strictly positive.7
A.2 Equilibrium
In the perfectly competitive intermediate-input sector, the equilibrium price of inputs produced is
simply pIi(c) = wic. In the final-good sector, firms choose which markets to enter, input quality
and output price (pO). The choice of input quality determines input price and, together with
the firm’s capability draw, output quality. The optimal output price is a fixed multiplicative
mark-up over costs, as is standard in Dixit-Stiglitz-type demand systems. Because there are no
fixed costs of quality, firms’ choices can be considered separately for each product line, indexed
by ij. The first-order conditions for each firm’s optimization problem for each production line
imply the following:
























































that θ < 0, these conditions imply that on a product line selling to a richer country a given firm
6The multiplicative factor 1
2
and the 2 in the exponent on c are convenient but not crucial. See Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012, fn 30).
7Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Chaney (2008) place an analogous lower bound on the shape parameter
for the Pareto distribution to ensure finite variance of the distribution of sales.
A3
will (1) purchase a higher level of input quality; (2) pay a higher input price; (3) produce higher
output quality; and (4) charge a higher output price.
The cut-offs for entry into each market, given the wage levels, wi, are pinned down by two sets
of conditions, similar to conditions in Melitz (2003). First, in each country firms on the margin






















− wifij = 0, i, j ∈ h, n, s (A6)
where the second equality uses (A5b) and (A5d). Second, in each country there is free entry and













− wife = 0, i ∈ h, n, s (A7)
where the term in square brackets is the expected per-period profit on the ij production line and
1−G(λ∗ij) is the ex ante probability that a firm’s capability draw is sufficiently high to be worth
producing for market j.





























λ∗jj , i 6= j (A9)























ζj , Λ is a 3x1 vector
with elements Λj =
1
(λ∗jj)
k (ordered h, n, s), and I is a 3x1 vector of ones.


















ζj . Since dj < 1, detA > 0 and hence A is invertible.
8 We thus have
8Note that the expression in brackets on the right-hand side of (A11) can be written 1 − dhdn − dhds − dnds +
A4


























The export cut-offs in each country follow immediately using (A9). As in Melitz (2003), a conve-
nient feature of this model is that the entry cutoffs do not depend on the scale of the economies.
The scale of the economies are pinned down by the requirements that the goods markets and
labor markets clear. Let Mij be the mass of firms from location i producing for destination j.












It must be the case that expenditures on manufactures in each country is equal to the revenues
















)k , j ∈ h, n, s (A15)
where the second equality uses (A8) and (A14).
Let αi be the share of the labor force in location i employed in the intermediate-input sector,
with the remainder in the outside sector. Total payments by final-good producers for material
inputs are equal to total payments by intermediate-input producers for labor. The per-period
fixed costs, f and fx, and the investment cost, fe, are also paid to workers. Let M
e
i be the mass
of entrepreneurs who pay the investment cost in location i. It must be the case that income of










+M ei wife, i ∈ h, n, s (A16)










, i ∈ h, n, s (A17)
In steady state, the mass of new entrants in each country is equal to the mass of plants that die:
M ei (1−G(λ∗)) = δMii, i ∈ h, n, s (A18)
2dhdnds and is invariant to the ordering of countries. We have written the expression in the form of (A11) to make
clear that is it positive.
A5
Combining (A7), (A14), (A17), and (A18), we have that Πi = M
e






ij(λ)), i ∈ h, n, s (A19)
Using (A8) and (A14), we can solve for the mass of firms active in location i as a function of the














 , i ∈ h, n, s (A20)
Substituting the equations (A20) into (A15), we have three equations in the three unknowns, αh,
αn, αs. These pin down the share of the labor force in manufacturing and hence the scale of each
economy.
A.3 Response to Exchange-Rate Shocks
In this setting, we can think of changes in real exchange rates as deriving from shocks to produc-
tivity in the homogeneous, “outside” sectors, represented by wi for i ∈ h, n, s. These affect the
wage level in each economy, and in turn affect the prices of all goods in manufacturing. As noted
above, we consider deviations from an equilibrium in which wh = wn = ws = 1.
Consider an increase in wn, which we can think of as an appreciation in North. We begin by
deriving predictions for the response of the various entry cutoffs. Partially differentiating (A10)


























































Using the definition of Λ, the fact that dj < 1 ∀j, (A9) and (A11), the comparative-static





























The intuition for the four results in (A22a) is straightforward. Northern exporters are put at a
disadvantage by the increase in the Northern wage and the consequent increase in input prices in
North, and marginal Northern exporters stop exporting to Home and South. Conversely, Home
and Southern exporters benefit from their lower costs relative to Northern producers in the market
in North, and firms previously below the cut-off for entering the Northern market can profitably
enter.
The intuition for the results in (A22b) is more subtle. In Home and South, the expansion
of profitable export opportunities induces a greater number of firms to pay the fixed investment
cost to get a productivity draw, increasing the measure of firms in the domestic market. This in
turn drives down the price index for differentiated goods and induces firms at the domestic cut-off
margin to exit, leading the domestic cut-offs to rise. There is an offsetting effect, in that producers
in Home and South face less competition in their domestic markets from Northern exporters, but
given the assumptions of our model (in particular, the assumptions about the Pareto distribution
of capabilities), the former effect always dominates the latter. Similar logic explains the increase
in cut-offs for Home exporters to South and Southern exporters to Home. An analogous argument
explains the fall in the cut-off in North: because export opportunities are less attractive, fewer
firms enter, the price index rises, and firms at the domestic cut-off margin become more profitable.
A convenient feature of this model is that firm-level revenues and output can be expressed as
functions of the entry cut-offs, without reference to the variables reflecting the scale of each of the
















That is, for a given firm with a given λ, output of each production line varies inversely with the
entry cut-offs for each market.
As in other firm-level datasets, in our data it is not possible to observe input prices at the
level of product lines. What is observable is an average of input prices across all product lines.


























Now consider the effect of an increase in the Northern wage on average firm-level output and
input prices for Home firms. The Northern wage, wn, does not enter the expressions for output
or input prices on a particular production line (refer to (A5b) and (A5d)). Hence any changes
in p∗O(λ) or p
∗
I(λ) in response to a change in wn must arise through changes in the output shares
destined for each market. For a Home firm that initially exports to both North and South, it
follows from (A22a)-(A22b) that its output share to North will increase and its output share to
Home and South will decrease. Given that output and input prices on the Northern production
line are greater than on either of the other lines (refer to (A5d) and (A5b)), this implies that
average output and input prices, p∗Oh(λ) and p
∗
Ih(λ) will both increase. In the case of Home firms
A7








Analogously, it is straightforward to show that an increase in the Southern wage has the opposite
effect on average output and input prices, since output and input prices are lower on the production







To summarize, (A26)-(A29) indicate that an increase in the wage level in North (which can be
interpreted as a real-exchange-rate appreciation in North) all else equal will lead to an increase
in firm-average output and input prices among Home firms, and an increase in the wage level in
South will lead to a decrease in both firm-average output and input prices. These are the testable
implications that we take to the data in the main text.
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Notes: Relative price level calculated as (1/e) ∗ CPIportugal,t
CPIjt
where e is the nominal exchange rate; this is the reciprocal of the real exchange rate as conventionally defined.
Relative price level normalized to 100 in 1997.



































































































































































Notes: Relative price level calculated as (1/e) ∗ CPIportugal,t
CPIjt
where e is the nominal exchange rate; this is the reciprocal of the real exchange rate as conventionally defined.
Relative price level normalized to 100 in 1997.
Table A1. Summary statistics, exports and imports, 1997













Germany 1 0.217 0.211 2 0.208 0.210
Spain 2 0.145 0.150 1 0.219 0.226
France 3 0.144 0.151 3 0.116 0.121
United Kingdom 4 0.125 0.130 4 0.070 0.073
Netherlands 5 0.055 0.054 6 0.038 0.040
Belgium-Luxemburg 6 0.052 0.052 8 0.029 0.029
United States 7 0.044 0.038 9 0.029 0.025
Italy 8 0.039 0.039 5 0.061 0.063
Sweden 9 0.020 0.019 13 0.009 0.007
Denmark 10 0.017 0.018 17 0.008 0.007
Austria 11 0.013 0.013 15 0.008 0.008
Switzerland 12 0.011 0.011 16 0.008 0.008
Brazil 13 0.009 0.009 10 0.026 0.026
Norway 14 0.008 0.008 11 0.012 0.012
Japan 15 0.007 0.005 7 0.034 0.029
Finland 16 0.007 0.007 18 0.007 0.007
Angola 17 0.006 0.007 34 0.002 0.000
Greece 18 0.005 0.005 41 0.001 0.002
Singapore 19 0.005 0.002 28 0.003 0.001
Israel 20 0.005 0.005 43 0.001 0.001
Turkey 21 0.005 0.005 22 0.003 0.003
Ireland 22 0.004 0.004 20 0.004 0.004
Australia 23 0.004 0.004 83 0.000 0.000
Canada 24 0.004 0.004 31 0.003 0.003
Morocco 25 0.004 0.004 29 0.003 0.003
Hungary 26 0.003 0.003 94 0.000 0.000
Russia 27 0.003 0.004 14 0.008 0.009
South Africa 28 0.003 0.003 21 0.004 0.004
Chile 29 0.002 0.003 66 0.001 0.001
Hong Kong 30 0.002 0.002 65 0.001 0.001
Poland 31 0.002 0.002 52 0.001 0.001
Cape Verde 32 0.002 0.002 64 0.001 0.001
China 33 0.002 0.002 26 0.003 0.003
Saudi Arabia 34 0.002 0.001 91 0.000 0.000
Argentina 35 0.002 0.002 60 0.001 0.001
Tunisia 36 0.001 0.001 38 0.002 0.002
Korea 37 0.001 0.001 12 0.011 0.001
Czech Republic 38 0.001 0.001 56 0.001 0.001
Algeria 39 0.001 0.001 88 0.000 0.000
Mexico 40 0.001 0.001 68 0.001 0.001
Mozambique 41 0.001 0.001 50 0.001 0.001
Thailand 42 0.001 0.001 37 0.002 0.002
Guinea-Bissau 43 0.001 0.001 117 0.000 0.000
Panama 44 0.001 0.000 110 0.000 0.000
Venezuela 45 0.001 0.001 77 0.000 0.000
India 46 0.001 0.001 19 0.005 0.006
Egypt 47 0.001 0.001 44 0.001 0.001
Cyprus 48 0.001 0.001 120 0.000 0.000
New Zealand 49 0.001 0.001 78 0.000 0.000
Slovak Republic 50 0.001 0.001 105 0.000 0.000
Total (bil. euros) 16.05 14.86 11.89 11.03
Notes: Table reports export shares by destination for all exporters (Column 2) and our estimation sample (Column
3) and import share by source country for all importers (Column 5) and our estimation sample (Column 6). Final
row reports total exports for all destinations and total imports from all sources. Countries poorer than Portugal
(in 1996 GDP/capita) appear in italics. Export and import ranks based on all exports and all imports, respectively
(i.e. not the estimation sample). Petroleum exports and imports excluded. Euro-zone countries included.
Table A2. Summary statistics, estimation sample, 1997-2005
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
sales 5.57 5.45 5.18 4.97 5.04 7.36 6.91 9.86 9.35
(0.51) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.50) (0.67) (0.61) (0.79) (0.70)
number of output categories 4.51 4.52 4.51 4.53 4.47 5.93 6.04 3.89 3.82
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09)
export share of sales 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.24
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
share of exports to richer countries 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.78
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
number of destination countries 7.71 7.53 7.53 7.53 7.50 7.32 7.15 8.85 8.94
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.33) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27)
number of export categories 10.03 9.89 9.88 9.86 10.02 9.76 9.39 13.04 13.77
(0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.72) (0.61) (0.56) (0.59)
avg. income of destination 11.62 11.63 11.60 11.48 11.41 10.73 10.69 11.46 11.36
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
purchases 3.24 3.09 2.91 2.87 2.92 4.19 3.70 5.49 5.12
(0.43) (0.35) (0.36) (0.43) (0.42) (0.37) (0.32) (0.55) (0.47)
number of input categories 7.70 8.12 8.44 8.78 8.90 7.05 7.18 7.75 7.87
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
import share of purchases 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.28 0.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
share of imports from richer countries 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
number of source countries 5.63 5.65 5.65 5.58 5.56 5.34 5.21 6.78 6.83
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)
number of import categories 21.74 21.70 21.94 22.00 21.61 20.06 20.60 29.41 31.04
(0.65) (0.64) (0.61) (0.59) (0.59) (1.19) (1.51) (1.28) (1.33)
average income of source 10.87 10.88 10.89 10.81 10.68 10.55 10.51 11.17 11.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
fraction exporter 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.60
fraction importer 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.60 0.59
N (firms) 6585 6873 7194 7713 7994 2046 2160 2455 2639
Notes: Table reports averages across firms, weighting firms equally. Average income of sales destination and purchase sources include the home market as possible
destination or source, as described in Section 3 of the text. Sales and purchases are in millions of 2002 Euros, avg. incomes of destination and source in thousands of 2002
Euros.
Table A3. Source-country characteristics and import prices in cross section, 1997
dep. var.: firm-product log import price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
richer than Portugal 0.55*** 0.27*
(0.11) (0.15)
log GDP/cap. 0.20*** 0.10**
(0.03) (0.04)
log GDP 0.05** 0.03 0.04** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
European Union -0.34*** -0.07 -0.29*** -0.07
(0.08) (0.16) (0.07) (0.15)
landlocked 0.18** 0.06 0.11 0.06
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13)
log distance -0.08 0.04 -0.07* 0.05
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
product effects Y N Y N
firm-product effects N Y N Y
R2 0.75 0.97 0.75 0.97
N 21792 21792 21792 21792
Notes: Sample is all firm-product-source observations for firms in estimation sample. Petroleum imports excluded.
Robust standard errors, clustered by source country, in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.
Table A4. First stage for baseline regressions, export rank 1-25
log avg. dest. income export share
log avg.
dest. distance
Instrument (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
export share of sales 0.51***
log avg. distance of destination market -0.00*** 0.02*** 0.04***
log sales 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.11***
United Kingdom -0.01 -0.06* -0.07* -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.39
United States 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.18
Sweden 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 1.31***
Switzerland 0.12** 0.11* 0.12* -0.01 0.01 0.55
Brazil -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.02** -0.01 0.43***
Norway -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.52
Japan 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.11
Angola -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01** 0.00 0.31***
Singapore 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.21
Israel 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.07
Turkey 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03* 0.04* 0.15
Australia 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
Canada -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.29
Morocco 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.92*
Hungary 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08
Russia -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* 0.02* 0.02 -0.04
South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.14
Chile -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.36
Hong Kong 0.05* 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.40**
Poland 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.42
Cape Verde -0.01 -0.16** -0.15** -0.30*** -0.28*** 0.37
China 0.07 0.08 0.08* 0.02 0.04 0.32
Saudi Arabia -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.24
Argentina 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** -0.00 0.00 0.10
Tunisia 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.51
initial source interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y
firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659 45659
R2 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.93
Notes: Covariate corresponding to fourth row is (indicator for positive 1997 export revenues from UK)*(relative price level in UK, current year). Covariates in subsequent
rows defined similarly. Table continued on following 3 pages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.
Table A4. (Continued) First stage for baseline regressions, export rank 26-50
log avg. dest. income export share
log avg.
dest. distance
Instrument (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Korea -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
Czech Republic -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Algeria -0.13** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.12* -0.13* -0.22
Mexico -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04* -0.06** -0.33
Mozambique 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.99***
Thailand 0.02 0.06* 0.05 0.06* 0.06 -0.18
Guinea-Bissau 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.12 -0.00 -3.07**
Panama -0.10** -0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.80**
Venezuela -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.03
India -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.19
Egypt 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.06
Cyprus -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.91**
New Zealand 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.24
Slovak Republic 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.46
Macao -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.01 0.07
Uruguay 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.04
Bulgaria 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.08 1.12**
Iceland -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.41
Zimbabwe 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.03** -0.03* 0.01
Senegal -0.25 -0.22 -0.23 0.06 0.04 -0.46
Colombia -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.16
Jordan 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.01
Nigeria 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13
Pakistan -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.39
Malaysia -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.70**
Notes: See above.
Table A4. (Continued) First stage for baseline regressions, export rank 51-75
log avg. dest. income export share
log avg.
dest. distance
Instrument (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ghana 0.04 0.10* 0.11* 0.11 0.13 0.54
Philippines -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.13
Kuwait -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.30
Romania -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 0.01 0.02 0.11
Lithuania -0.10* -0.03 -0.03 0.15 0.13 -0.36
Moldova -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.11
Kenya -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 0.04 -0.01 -1.26
Dominican Republic 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.24
Ukraine -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11
Cote d’Ivoire 0.37 0.00 0.04 -0.72 -0.63 2.12
Libya 0.04*** 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18
Syrian Arab Republic -0.06 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12* -0.13* -0.33
Croatia 0.60 0.69 0.76 0.17 0.32 3.61
Guatemala 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.03 -0.12
Peru 0.12* 0.07 0.07 -0.10* -0.11 -0.14
Estonia -0.30* -0.27 -0.28 0.06 0.04 -0.50
Vietnam -0.11 -0.15* -0.15* -0.08 -0.08 0.06
Ethiopia -0.28*** -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.12 -0.08 1.00
Mauritius 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.30
Latvia -0.06 -0.16 -0.19 -0.20 -0.27 -1.68
Paraguay -0.06** -0.04 -0.05* 0.03 0.01 -0.40
Bahrain 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.17** 0.20** 0.77**
Sri Lanka 0.23* 0.18 0.18 -0.10 -0.10 0.05
Iran 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01
Netherlands Antilles 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08* 0.92*
Notes: See above.
Table A4. (Continued) First stage for baseline regressions, export rank 76-100
log avg. dest. income export share
log avg.
dest. distance
Instrument (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
El Salvador -0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.79*
Armenia -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.82
Malawi 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.34
Jamaica 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.31
Yemen 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.21 -4.51
Gabon -0.25** -0.36*** -0.34** -0.22* -0.17 1.20
Cameroon -0.89* -1.47*** -1.45*** -1.14*** -1.10** 0.91
Tanzania -0.09** -0.10** -0.10** -0.03 -0.03 0.05
Costa Rica 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.27
Qatar 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Indonesia -0.06* -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.26
Honduras -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.51*
Kazakhstan 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.67
Zambia -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.82
Burkina Faso 0.50* 1.12*** 1.23*** 1.22*** 1.48*** 6.38**
Bangladesh 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.99*
Madagascar 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.11 -0.13
Georgia 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.16 -0.97
Albania 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.39
Togo 0.37 0.32 0.39 -0.10 0.05 3.56
Benin -0.60 -1.43* -1.55** -1.65** -1.92** -6.55
Dem. Rep. of Congo 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.05
Rep. of Congo -0.42*** -0.22 -0.22 0.38** 0.40* 0.50
Mauritania -0.15** -0.10 -0.11 0.11* 0.07 -0.80
Niger 0.96** 1.07** 1.01** 0.22 0.08 -3.55
Notes: See above.
Table A5. Destination income and firm average input prices, LIML estimates
dep. var.: firm-average log real input price
(1) (2) (3)
log avg. destination gdp/cap 1.15*** 1.16** 0.96**
(0.44) (0.51) (0.48)
export share of sales -0.56** -0.58 -0.47
(0.23) (0.71) (0.68)
log avg. destination distance -0.00 0.00 0.25**
(0.00) (0.02) (0.12)
log sales 0.02** 0.02** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
initial source interactions Y Y Y
firm effects Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y
N 45659 45659 45659
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (under-identification) 248.92 192.30 232.20
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-stat 2.65 2.09 2.32
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F-stat 2.17 2.18 2.18
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Instruments are interactions of indicators for positive exports to destination in 1997 and log relative price
level (reciprocal of real-exchange rate). Initial source interactions, included directly as covariates, are defined
analogously to the instruments, using indicators for initial imports. Columns 5 treats only log avg. destination
GDP/cap as endogenous; Column 6 adds export share of sales, and Column 7 adds log avg. destination distance
to endogenous set. Petroleum exports and imports excluded. Euro-zone countries not included in instrument set.



















































Export Destinations and Input Prices		
	
	
Paulo	Bastos,	Joana	Silva,	Eric	Verhoogen	
	
	
May	2014	
CGEG‐CDEP	WORKING	PAPER	SERIES	
